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Summary 
 Biased policing against racial and ethnic minorities is an important 
public policy issue. Theoretical analysis and empirical results on this 
issue has been plagued by an assortment of problems which confront 
research on the nature and significance of police discrimination 
against social groups. This paper presents and applies a non-
parametric test that is robust to a host of methodological difficulties. 
We theoretically and empirically contrast our non-parametric test with 
other tests that are prominent in the literature. Utilizing data provided 
by the Florida Highway Patrol, our empirical results strongly reject 
the null hypothesis that FHP troopers of different races do not en-
gage in racially biased searches of stopped drivers. More particularly, 
there is evidence of police bias against African American male and 
Latino drivers by all officers and no evidence of police bias against 
white male drivers by any group of officers.  
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Driving while black:  
Do police pass the test? 
Patrick L. Mason*  
 
 
American racial and ethnic minorities often claim they are subjected 
to racially biased traffic stops, searches, and enforcement actions. In 
particular, Latino and African American motorists have labeled this 
phenomenon “driving while brown” or “driving while black.” But, 
the perception of illegitimate racial profiling as a widespread element 
of law enforcement is at odds with publicly announced policies of law 
enforcement agencies such as the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP, 
2003). The FHP states that, “profiling is illegal, inconsistent with the 
principles of American policing, and an indefensible public protection 
strategy.” Further, the official policy of the FHP states that both pa-
trolmen who are found guilty of engaging in racial profiling and su-
pervisory officers who found guilty of condoning, encouraging, or 
ignoring patterns of profiling will be subject to disciplinary actions. 
Indeed, the FHP requires that supervisors take proactive steps to pre-
vent profiling. 
Racial or ethnic bias in policing may occur because of the social 
preferences of individual officers or because of the organizational cul-
ture of police agencies. Or, racial and ethnic differences in policing 
outcomes may indicate efficient enforcement rather than biased polic-
ing. Conceivably, racial disparities in policing outcomes may occur 
because of differences in the behavioral characteristics of citizens. For 
instance, if African Americans and Latinos are more likely to engage 
in traffic violations or criminal behavior then we will observe that 
drivers of these social groups are more likely to be stopped and 
searched than drivers of other social groups.  
Finally, whether or not a given racial and ethnic pattern of policing 
outcomes represents biased policing, efficient enforcement, or both 
 
* I wish to thank the Economic Council of Sweden for the opportunity to participate in the “Con-
ference on Gender and Ethnic Discrimination,” Stockholm, October 30, 2006. I am also particu-
larly indebted to Mahmood Arai and Lena Nekby for their substantive and editorial comments 
on this paper. Of course, all remaining errors are solely mine. 
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may well depend upon what one considers the fundamental objective 
of policing agencies. For example, if maximizing the “hit” rate (the 
fraction of searched drivers who are actually guilty of a crime) is the 
objective of law enforcement then we might well observe identical 
marginal hit rates across all social groups. However, this pattern of 
policing outcomes may not be consistent with policing which seeks to 
maximize public safety (minimize criminal activity of drivers).  
Similarly, policing which seeks to maintain social control might be 
intentionally discriminatory even as it is also efficient with respect to 
the goal of maintaining social control. Socially cohesive communities, 
it is argued, have the families and non-governmental institutions that 
are sufficient to establish anti-crime norms of behavior that strongly 
discourage criminal activity. Less cohesive communities do not have 
the resources to establish strong social control over potential crime 
behavior. Social control related policing then refers to policing that is 
putatively designed to prevent criminal activity and to install appro-
priate respect for (or fear of) law enforcement officers among indi-
viduals who reside in communities that the police believe do not have 
the social cohesion necessary to establish strong anti-crime norms of 
behavior (see Choongh, 1998).  
The present study focuses on FHP searches of stopped drivers. 
Specifically, we wish to determine if empirical evidence is consistent 
with racially unbiased searches of stopped drivers by individual law 
enforcement officers. We use evolutionary game theory to construct a 
political economics model of policing where the costs of failed 
searches constrain police discretion. Further, these costs vary with the 
racial and ethnic identity of stopped drivers. We include data on 
trooper characteristics as a means of identifying differential policing. 
Non-parametric results associated with an outcomes test presented 
herein show that the empirical evidence is not consistent with the ef-
ficient enforcement hypothesis; instead, we find that the statistical 
evidence is consistent with racially biased searches by law enforce-
ment officers. Whether or not a stopped driver is searched is a sepa-
rate issue from the precise nature of the enforcement actions brought 
against the driver by the FHP. We do not explore here whether indi-
vidual officers carry out racially or ethnically biased enforcement ac-
tions against searched and un-searched drivers, that is, whether or not 
a stopped driver is given a traffic citation, an equipment citation, 
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charged with a crime, or receives no punitive action at all.1 Nor do we 
explore whether racial and ethnic bias is a determinant of which driv-
ers police elect to stop. Finally, this study does not attempt to distin-
guish among the possibly multiple causes of biased policing. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a discussion 
of the literature. We focus on the problems associated with determin-
ing a comparative benchmark for empirical analyses of biased polic-
ing. Also, we discuss the incentives for police to engage in discrimina-
tory behavior. Section 2 provides an evolutionary traffic search game, 
which establishes an outcomes test for assessing the presence of ra-
cially and ethnically biased policing. We argue that this test has greater 
power than similar tests proposed in the recent literature on racial 
profiling and traffic searches by police officers. Our empirical analysis 
is offered in section 3. Our results suggest that police engage in ra-
cially and ethnically biased policing, to the detriment of African 
American and Latino drivers. We conclude in section 4. 
1. Literature review 
1.1. Biased policing defined 
According to the FHP, illegitimate profiling exists when “the vehicle 
occupant's race, ethnicity, gender, or economic status was the reason 
for initiating the traffic stop and/or subsequent search of the vehi-
cle.” Nevertheless, the FHP’s definition of racial profiling is inade-
quate. Specifically, it is too limiting to say that profiling exists only 
when social group status is “the” reason for initiating a traffic stop or 
vehicle search. Such a definition wrongly suggests that if social group 
status is also used in combination with other legitimate factors then 
profiling does not exist. Simultaneously, the FHP definition is also 
too narrow because it does not include differential enforcement ac-
tions in its definition of racial profiling nor does the FHP definition 
include actions that Georges-Abeyie (1989, 1990a, p. 12) has labeled 
“petit apartheid.” Specifically, Georges-Abeyie discusses several in-
formal, punitively discriminatory, and discretionary police actions that 
may not appear in official statistics. Examples include verbal assaults, 
rough or brutal treatment, unnecessary stops, questions, and searches, 
a lack of civility faced for racial and ethnic group suspects/arrestees, 
 
1 See Close and Mason (2006) for an analysis of enforcement actions. 
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and judicial instructions to juries that are of a lower quality, clarity, 
and objectivity when an African American or Latino arrestee is on 
trial. 
The National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives 
(NOBLE) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) have 
offered definitions of racial profiling that are closer to economists’ 
understanding of discrimination as a residual influence after taking 
into account those factors that legitimately influence an outcome of 
interest. Specifically, NOBLE states that biased policing exists when, 
“The act (intentional or unintentional) of applying or incorporating 
personal, societal or organizational biases and/or stereotypes in deci-
sion-making, police actions or the administration of justice (NOBLE, 
2001, p. 4).” Similarly, PERF states that “Racially biased policing oc-
curs when law enforcement inappropriately considers race and ethnic-
ity when deciding with whom and how to intervene in an enforce-
ment capacity (Fridell, et al., 2001).” In other words, if an individual 
officer’s enforcement behavior is biased by personal racial, ethnic or 
gender prejudice or animus toward other-group motorists or favorit-
ism toward own-group drivers, this constitutes abuse of police discre-
tion.  
1.2. Comparative benchmark 
Establishing a comparative benchmark represents an important and 
difficult obstacle for determining whether racial and ethnic inequality 
in traffic stops represents biased policing (Zingraff et al., 2000; Fridell 
et al., 2001). For example, the US General Accounting Office Report 
2000 indicates that because of methodological challenges, it cannot 
“determine whether the rate at which African-Americans or other mi-
norities are stopped is disproportionate to the rate at which they 
commit violations that put them at risk of being stopped.” (Fridell et 
al., 2001, p. 136) Initially, the question of establishing a comparative 
benchmark arose as a methodological issue to determine whether a 
particular ethnic or racial group is being stopped disproportionately 
(Ramirez et al., 2000; Harris, 2002).  Ramirez et al. (2000, p. 53) de-
scribe two different types of benchmarks: those that are external to 
the traffic-stop data and those that may be generated from within the 
data set. External benchmarks are defined as estimates of the percent-
ages of persons by racial and ethnic group who are at risk for being 
stopped on roads that are patrolled by the law enforcement agency. 
Fridell et al. (2001, p. 137) define external standards as “those based 
DRIVING WHILE BLACK: DO POLICE PASS THE TEST?, Patrick L. Mason 
85 
on existing data, such as census data, or on new data, such as that 
provided by observing vehicles on the road.” Within-data bench-
marks or internal standards are described by Fridell et al. (2001, p. 
137) as “analogous to an early warning system.”  In this case, officers, 
units, districts, geographic areas or other groupings are matched and 
compared with one another to control for factors such as circum-
stances and context. Reliance on external standards developed from 
existing data, appears to be the norm for most jurisdictions. Accord-
ing to Fridell, et al., the utilization of census data, drivers license in-
formation, vehicle accident data, Uniform Crime Report (UCR) arrest 
data, and researcher observation have served as external standards for 
some studies. Depending on the context in which they are applied, 
each of these standards has unique benefits as well as limitations.  
Among studies that wish to examine the issue of racial profiling of 
motorists, evidence of discrimination is determined according to 
whether the racial-ethnic composition of stopped drivers differs from 
the racial-ethnic composition of an appropriately defined comparison 
group (Ramirez et al., 2000). Suppose, for example, Latinos are 35 
percent of stopped drivers, but 15 percent of the population in the 
enforcement area. We cannot therefore conclude that relative inequal-
ity in the ethnic composition of traffic stops represents discrimina-
tion. The ethnic composition of the population may be quite different 
from the ethnic composition of drivers, which may differ still from 
the ethnic composition of persons engaged in a traffic violation or 
illegal activity, which may differ according to the time or date officers 
are deployed in an area.  
The present study focuses on trooper actions after the traffic stop, 
specifically whether or not a stopped driver is searched. Nevertheless, 
the external comparative benchmark issue reasserts itself via the ques-
tion of whether or not the coefficients of regression equations are 
statistically biased because of the existence of unobserved variables. 
For example, if preferences for and indicators of guilt of criminal ac-
tivity are stronger among Non-Hispanic whites this may be observed 
by officers but not included in the data available to analysts. Thus, if 
regression analysis shows that white drivers and Latino drivers are 
equally likely to be searched the analyst would draw the erroneous 
conclusion that the data is consistent with unbiased policing.    
The internal comparative benchmark issue reasserts itself via the 
issue of whether or not troopers of alternative racial and ethnic 
groups observe drivers of the same racial and ethnic composition. For 
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example, African American and white officers may be deployed in a 
fashion such that white officers observe a disproportionate number of 
African American drivers while African American officers observe a 
disproportionate number of white drivers. So, in this case, regression 
results will show a correlation between the probability of search and 
the officer-driver identity match: white officers are more likely to 
search black drivers and less likely to search white drivers, while Afri-
can American officers are more likely to search white drivers and less 
likely to search African American drivers. Yet, in this instance, the 
statistical importance of the identity match of officers and drivers re-
flects only differences in the racial composition of drivers in the re-
spective areas of deployment of officers—not biased policing.  
1.3. Inframarginality problem 
The so-called “inframarginality problem” represents an additional 
element of the comparative benchmark issue. Standard economic 
theory focuses on the treatment of the marginal unit of analysis, in 
this case, the marginal driver. Standard regression analysis however 
focuses on the treatment of the average unit of observation, the typi-
cal driver. The “marginal motorists” are the last individuals deemed 
sufficiently suspicious to stop and search, but marginal drivers are not 
identified in the dataset. Consider the “hit rate,” the fraction of times 
searched drivers are found guilty of possessing contraband. Impor-
tantly, inequality of average hit rates does not necessarily imply ine-
quality of marginal hit rates. The marginal driver is the theoretical 
benchmark, but the average driver is the statistical benchmark; hence, 
this is an additional reason that standard regression analysis designed 
to detect whether or not race has a statistically significant residual ef-
fect, and thereby reject the null hypothesis that the police do not en-
gage in racial discrimination, may be plagued by the omitted variables 
problem.  
1.4. An outcomes test for biased policing  
An important insight of Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) (KPT, 
hereafter) is that if police agencies are solely concerned with maximiz-
ing the hit rate, then in equilibrium we will observe equal hit rates 
across racial groups. However, this equilibrium is also associated with 
statistical discrimination since search rates need not be equal across 
social groups. If hit rates are not equal police may arbitrage the differ-
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ence across racial groups so as to maximize the overall hit rate. As 
police increase their searches of high crime groups, drivers in those 
groups respond by decreasing their criminal involvement. As police 
decrease their searches of low crime groups, drivers in those groups 
respond by increasing their criminal involvement. Police will continue 
to reallocate their searches across social groups until the hit rates of 
both groups are equal. At equilibrium, equality of hit rates implies that 
the social group with the higher (lower) criminal propensity will have 
the higher (lower) search rate. 
Let γ(r, R) equal the search rate of race r = {a, l, w} motorists by 
race R = {A, L, W} officers and allow χ(r, R) to be a similarly defined 
hit rate, where the racial-ethnic groups are African Americans (a, A), 
Latinos (l, L) and whites (w, W). Although KPT presents the original 
statement, Persico and Todd (2005) present a stronger theorem of the 
empirical outcomes we should observe when biased policing is not 
present.  
“In any equilibrium, the hit rate is the same across all subgroups within a race. 
If the police are unbiased, the hit rate is the same across races, too. If the police 
are biased against race r, the hit rate is lower in race r than in the other race” 
(Persico and Todd, 2005, p.13). 
 
It is important to note that the Persico and Todd efficient en-
forcement theorem assumes that drivers are heterogeneous in their 
characteristics and that officers are heterogeneous (not monolithic) 
with respect to the benefits and costs associated with police search 
activity.  
KPT propose an extraordinarily simple outcomes test: divide the 
data into alternative social groups and compare hit rates. If the differ-
ence is statistically significant police are discriminating against the 
group with the lower hit rate. With KPT, we do not have to worry 
about whether our regression results suffer from omitted variable bias 
nor whether or not we are observing the marginal driver. Drivers 
from the group with higher criminality will have higher search rates, 
but the average hit rate for all groups will be equal. The KPT model 
predicts that all motorists of a given race, if they are searched at all, 
will carry contraband with an equal probability regardless of the other 
observable characteristics of the motorist. Hence, the comparative 
benchmark issues are not relevant.2 
 
2 Persico (2002) has shown that under these conditions, there is no tradeoff be-
tween police efficiency and egalitarian provision of civil liberties across racial 
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As an example of how to apply the KPT test, suppose that white 
drivers have a higher preference for crime than Latinos and neither 
white nor Latino officers are ethnically biased. For Latino-white 
bivariate comparisons, the KPT efficient enforcement theorem sug-
gests that we should observe 
 
γ γ γ γw W w L l W l L, , , , ,b g b g b g b g= > = and  KPT, ib g   
 
χ χ χ χw W w L l W l L, , , ,b g b g b g b g= > = .  KPT, iib g   
 
If the KPT conditions hold then we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of efficient enforcement (that is, no discrimination) even though 
whites in this instance are searched at a higher rate. 
Following the empirical work of Close and Mason (2002) and the 
practice of others within the literature on biased policing, Anwar and 
Fang (2006) (AF, hereafter) also argue that statistical discrimination 
by police agencies may occur when race helps predict whether a 
driver is carrying contraband (Bjerk, 2004; Dharmapala and Ross, 
2004).3 However, AF argue that if the signal on a driver’s guilt is en-
dogenous, KPT’s model will not eliminate the inframarginality prob-
lem. Assume that θ* is the threshold guilt signal. If so, all stopped 
drivers who emit a signal θ > θ* will be searched by the police. By an 
endogenous guilt signal, AF mean that stopped drivers who are actu-
ally guilty of a crime are more likely than non-criminal drivers to emit 
θ > θ*. 
AF then provide the following proposition for African American 
and white police officers and drivers.  
 
If neither race-A nor race-W of police officers exhibit racial prejudice, then nei-
ther the rankings of γ(r, A) and γ(r, W) nor the rankings of average search 
success rates χ(r, A) and of χ(r, W) depends on r ∈ {a, w}. Moreover, for 
 
groups. See also Myers (2002) for a detailed analysis of the public policy implica-
tions of any tradeoff between police efficiency and civil rights equity with respect to 
racial profiling.  
3 See Close and Mason (2007) for greater detail on the specifics of Bjerk, Dharma-
pala and Ross, and other critics of KPT. 
DRIVING WHILE BLACK: DO POLICE PASS THE TEST?, Patrick L. Mason 
89 
any r, the ranking of γ(r, A) and γ(r, W) should be the exact opposite of the 
ranking of χ(r, A) and of χ(r, W).4 
 
With endogenous guilt signals, according to AF, we are left with 
examining only the rank-order of search rates and hit rates. Suppose 
white officers search more than African American and Latino offi-
cers. AF conclude that the data do not allow them to reject the null 
hypothesis of no discrimination if the following rank-order conditions 
hold:  
 
γ γ γ γa A a W w A w W, , , , ,b g b g b g b g< <and and  AF. ib g   
 
χ χ χ χa A a W w A w W, , , , .b g b g b g b g> >and  AF. iib g   
 
The AF test has rather limited power to detect discrimination. For 
example, even if both (AF.i) and (AF.ii) are true, the AF test will not 
detect discrimination under at least two conditions: 1) both minority 
and white officers discriminate against minority drivers, but white of-
ficers are more discriminatory; and, 2) minority and white officer 
search differentials are “too large” relative to minority and white hit 
rate differentials. As such, even if the rank-order of search rates and 
hit rates are consistent with the AF test requirements, the strongest 
claim that we may make is that the data do reject the null hypothesis 
of efficient enforcement. Of course, this is a very weak claim since it 
is also consistent with the alternative hypothesis that discrimination 
exists.   
We present below a more powerful test. Further, we apply this test 
to the re-weighted FHP data constructed by AF. Our test reaches 
more definitive conclusions and we overturn the central conclusion of 
the AF study, i.e., we show that whether we use re-weighted data (as 
does AF) or completely raw data (we do here) the data reject the null 
hypothesis of efficient enforcement.  
1.5. Incentives to discriminate 
Policing is necessarily a highly discretionary and decentralized activity, 
which takes place in a market structure that is not characterized by the 
 
4 The notation of this proposition has been altered to fit the notation of this paper; 
otherwise, this is a direct quote from Anwar and Fang. 
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competitive pursuit of profit (Benson, 2003; Klein, 1979; Blomberg et 
al., 2002). Social scientists may disagree over whether the pursuit of 
profit by firms abets or ameliorates equality of opportunity, but there 
is near uniform agreement that unrestricted monopolies allow indi-
viduals with discriminatory preferences to indulge their racial beliefs 
without the disciplinary effect of market competition (Becker, 1957; 
Mason, 1999). Accordingly, even if executive policy within the FHP 
does not condone discriminatory behavior, implementation impedi-
ments (for example, individual trooper racial/ethnic stereotypes) 
combined with the high level of trooper discretion required for effec-
tive law enforcement may generate persistently biased policing. More-
over, the design and implementation of policies concerned with issues 
other than racial profiling and that are seemingly race-neutral, such as 
the much publicized “war on drugs,” may have putatively unintended 
collateral consequences. Racially disparate outcomes in traffic en-
forcement searches may be one of these consequences.  
Many scholars believe police abuse their discretionary authority by 
excessively stopping, searching, and charging African Americans and 
Latinos (Harris, 1999a,b).5 For example, enforcing social discipline 
may require presumptive detention or search of some persons who 
are not current law breakers (Choongh, 1998). Choongh demonstrates 
that police sometime detain individuals that they have no intention of 
charging with an offense. Police engage in this sort of behavior be-
cause they are interested in subordinating sections of society viewed 
as anti-police or excessively criminal, rather than because they are 
immediately interested in criminal law enforcement. So, all stopped or 
searched drivers are not suspects; some drivers—detainees—may be 
stopped and searched for purposes of social control. The discretion 
awarded to individual officers on the street and to police agencies at 
the police station allows them to pursue an agenda of social control 
along with an agenda of criminal apprehension. The social control 
hypothesis suggests a higher ratio of detainees to suspects among tar-
geted demographic groups. In our case, the social control hypothesis 
implies drivers in counties with large African American, Latino, and 
poor populations will face greater search intensity (and suspicion)—
 
5 The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (2003) has argued that police abuse of 
discretion proceeds from two (false) assumptions: “(1) blacks and Hispanics com-
mit most crimes, and (2) most blacks and Hispanics commit crimes (p. 10).” 
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given the county’s crime rate and other factors that might reasonably 
affect the probability that a driver is searched.6 
Choongh’s social control hypothesis is in agreement with some re-
cent empirical findings. Donohue and Levitt (2001) show that in-
creases in the minority composition of a city’s police force increases 
the arrests of whites but has little impact on the arrests of nonwhites. 
Similarly, increases in the fraction of white officers lead to increases in 
the number of arrests of nonwhites but has no effect on the number 
of white arrests. Meehan and Ponder (2002) report that African 
American motorists stopped and searched in neighborhoods with 
higher fractions of white residents are less likely to have contraband 
than white motorists stopped in these same neighborhoods; yet, Afri-
can American motorists are burdened with disproportionate surveil-
lance and stopping by police in neighborhoods with a higher fraction 
of white residents.  
Gordon (1971) establishes that policing is a political process that is 
regulated by a rational economic calculus that includes the political 
power of social groups. Citizens monitor policing activity and use 
their collective power to make adjustments in police practice. A 
straightforward application of Gordon’s perspective suggests that the 
political economic power of citizens to impose costs on police for 
engaging in unnecessary or excessive searching varies according to 
several factors: an individual’s access to public officials with regula-
tory authority over police, information regarding police oversight and 
citizen rights, ability to afford competent legal council, discretionary 
time to carry-out and persist with a complaint against police, belief 
that legal system will support citizens who make accusations against 
police, etc.. These factors vary across individuals and broad social 
groups. Racial and ethnic minorities in Florida have substantially less 
political, economic, and social power than whites (Button et al., 1998; 
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, 2003). Accordingly, 
troopers may have individual incentives to use their discretionary 
powers to search racial and ethnic minorities at a higher rate than oth-
erwise identical whites.   
Finally, our analysis of policing behavior should incorporate some 
of the recent theoretical implications of the economics of identity. In 
 
6 In a similar vein, Blalock (1967) argues that some police officers believe racial and 
ethnic minorities represent a social threat. The greater the perception of social 
threat, the more likely a police officer will use his discretionary authority to engage 
in racial profiling (Cureton, 2001). 
DRIVING WHILE BLACK: DO POLICE PASS THE TEST?, Patrick L. Mason 
92 
particularly, Darity, Mason, and Stewart (2006) show that persistent 
antagonistic intergroup relations combined with intragroup altruism 
are elements of individual identity construction in a racialized society. 
If we apply this perspective to policing, the racial-ethnic identity 
match of officers and drivers may affect policing practice. Moreover, 
the relationship between the racial-ethnic identity match officers and 
drivers may vary according to the ecology of the traffic stop, viz., 
whether the stop occurs in a predominantly African American, La-
tino, or white area.  
1.6. Summary  
Biased searches of stopped drivers exists when officers inappropri-
ately use race to determine whether a stopped driver should be 
searched. Establishing a comparative benchmark has been one of the 
difficulties of empirical tests of biased policing. The comparative 
benchmark problems has several dimensions: 1) the inframarginality 
problem, that is, distinguishing between police treatment of the aver-
age versus the marginal driver, 2) determining whether the racial 
composition of observed and stopped drivers is the same as the racial 
composition of drivers engaged in criminal activities, and 3) possible 
omitted variable bias in regression models. KPT developed a non-
parametric outcomes test which purportedly evades the issues associ-
ated with the comparative benchmark problem. Assuming that police 
seek to maximize the hit rate, KPT show that in equilibrium we will 
observe statistical discrimination with unequal search rates (varying 
directly with the differential criminality of social groups) but equal hit 
rates, within and across social groups. However, among other issues, 
if stopped drivers who are actually guilty of a crime are more likely 
than non-criminal drivers to emit θ > θ* then the KPT test must be 
revised.7 
It may also be the case that police do not seek to maximize the hit 
rate. Instead, they may seek to maximize public safety (that is, to 
minimize crime). Or, police may seek greater or lesser social control 
over alternative social groups. In either case, the KPT conditions for 
efficient enforcement are unlikely to provide the appropriate test for 
the absence of discrimination. The extant literature has also discussed 
several plausible explanations of why biased policing might exist.  
 
7 See Close and Mason (2007) for a more complete discussion of the criticisms of 
the KPT test. 
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Accordingly, two empirical possibilities arise when we combine the 
social control discussion, the economics of identity framework, and 
our evaluation of the literature: i) racially or ethnically biased policing 
may occur when the race of the officer differs from the race of the 
driver; and, ii) all officers, regardless of race or ethnicity, may exhibit 
biased policing against drivers of racial or ethnic minority groups. Al-
though we do not attempt to distinguish among the alternative expla-
nations of biased policing, we do derive and empirically examine a 
more general outcomes test than those presented heretofore in the 
existing literature. We turn now to discuss our theoretical framework 
and to present a rank-order test whose application depends on the 
specific empirical assumptions that we are willing make regarding po-
lice practice. 
2. Theoretical model 
Consider an evolutionary game with two agents, drivers and officers 
(or troopers) (see Table 1). There are four strategies available to driv-
ers: whether to commit a traffic violation (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) in combination 
with whether to engage in a criminal activity (0 ≤ χ ≤ 1). Traffic viola-
tions include such activities as speeding, driving without a valid 
driver’s license, driving a vehicle with sufficiently impaired equipment 
such that it violates vehicle safety standards, failure to obey traffic 
signs, or other acts that are not necessarily criminal but that do war-
rant police sanction. Traffic violations are the major reason any driver 
is stopped. For example, in our sample, speeding (70 percent of driv-
ers) is the major traffic stop rationale. Drivers who do not engage in 
traffic violations are unlikely to be stopped by state troopers. We des-
ignate χ  as the fraction of all drivers “at risk” of committing a crime. 
A certain fraction of drivers (1 - χ ) will not engage in criminal activity 
regardless of the policing strategy of law enforcement agencies; hence, 
χ ≤ χ  is the actual fraction of drivers engaged in criminal activity. 
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Each trooper has six strategies, which flow from the probability of 
whether or not a driver is observed (ρ), whether an observed driver is 
stopped (σ), whether troopers are suspicious of a stopped driver (ε), 
and whether there is no search, a voluntary search (γ), or an involun-
tary search of a suspicious driver (γ ). A voluntary search occurs 
when a police officer asks and the driver consents to having his vehi-
cle searched. Drivers may refuse the police request to search. All vol-
untary searches are highly discretionary. There are several involuntary 
searches, that is searches that occur against the will of the driver. High 
discretion non-voluntary searches include inventory search, plain view 
search,  probable  cause  search,  and  stop  and  frisk  search. Limited 
discretion non-voluntary searches include search incident to arrest 
and searches that occur with search warrant. 
Let vd represent the driver’s valuation of criminal activity, while vp 
represents the police’s valuation of detecting an individual engaged in 
criminal activity. Drivers receive a benefit y when they carry out a 
traffic violation. For example, y might indicate the value of time saved 
when a driver speeds. There is a fine (f) for a driving violation (same 
as police benefit for stopping a driver guilty of traffic offense) and 
costs (cσ ≤ cε ≤ cγ ≤ γc ) for non-suspicious stops, stops with no 
search, voluntary searches, and involuntary searches, respectively, of 
drivers with no criminal violation. Drivers incur a cost (j) when they 
engage in and are found guilty of a criminal activity.8 A driver who 
engages in no crime and who obeys the traffic laws has a utility payoff 
of u > 0. Further, for drivers who are uninvolved in criminal activity, 
tσ is the trooper’s cost of stopping a driver (including the opportunity 
cost of the trooper’s time and the political cost of stopping a non-
suspicious driver); tε is the trooper’s cost of stopping but not search-
ing a suspicious driver (such a driver might be questioned by the 
trooper and perhaps even receive but refuse a voluntary search re-
quest); tγ and γt  are the trooper’s costs associated with voluntary and 
involuntary driver searches, respectively; and, tσ ≤ tε ≤ tγ ≤ γt . 
Drivers and troopers have only limited information. Drivers know 
the costs and benefits associated with alternative strategies (vd, j, y, f, 
cσ, cε, cγ, and γc ), but they do not know 1) the fraction of drivers pur-
 
8 We assume that if a criminal driver is searched the driver’s crime will be uncov-
ered and the driver will be convicted in court. We further assume that police do not 
falsely charge drivers. These are standard assumptions in the literature. 
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suing a particular strategy or the fraction of officers pursuing a par-
ticular strategy (χ, λ, ρ, σ, ε, γ, γ ) or 2) the incentive structure of of-
ficers (vp, vγ, γv , vε, f, vσ, tσ, tε, tγ, and γt ). Similarly, troopers know 
their own incentive structure but they do not know the distribution of 
strategies among drivers or officers and they do know the incentive 
structure of drivers. Each driver selects a strategy and compares his 
payoff to drivers playing the same or different strategies. If a driver 
playing a different strategy has a superior payoff, the driver with the 
inferior outcome changes to the strategy of the driver with the supe-
rior payoff. Similarly, officers compare their strategies with the strate-
gies played by other officers. Police strategies with the highest payoff 
are imitated while those with lower payoffs are eliminated. Equilib-
rium is established by competitive elimination of strategies with infe-
rior payoffs.  
2.1. Equilibrium 
Let Di, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, represent the four driver strategies and Oτ, τ = 1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, represent the six officer strategies. The replicator dynamic 
for this system is 
 
& , , , ,D D E D E Driver ii i i= − =b g b g 1 2 3 4 and   
 
& , , , , , , .O O E O E Officerτ τ τ τ= − =b g b g 1 2 3 4 5 6   
 
Often, the replicator dynamic for games of this sort suggests a 
corner solution as the stable outcome. However, working from ob-
served outcomes back to our theoretical model we know that the 
equilibrium is an interior solution. Or, even if the dynamics suggest a 
corner solution in the long run for one-time perturbations of equilib-
rium it may be the case that the model is subjected to multiple and 
continuous perturbations and is unable to move unimpeded to long 
run equilibrium.   
We may derive equilibrium via the payoff functions of the officers 
and drivers. (Without loss of generality, the derivation of the reaction 
functions makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
searches). 
Officers seek the optimal search rate such that 
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which yields the reaction function  
 
χ χ ρσ ε λγ γ ε ε= , , , , , , , , .v v f t v tpc h  
 
Accordingly, χ* is a vertical line in (γ, χ) space. If χ < χ* no drivers 
will be searched, though at χ > χ* all drivers will be searched. If offi-
cers are idiosyncratic then the reaction function will be upward slop-
ing.   
Drivers seek the optimal crime rate such that 
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which yields the reaction function  
 
γ γ ρσ ε λ γ σ ε= u v j y f c c cd, , , , , , , , , , .c h  
 
Accordingly, γ* is a horizontal line in (γ, χ) space. If γ < γ* all (or, 
at least χ ) drivers will commit an offense, though at γ > γ* no driver 
will commit an offense. If drivers are individually distinctive then the 
reaction function will be downward sloping. 
Both public safety and the hit are maximized at (γ*,χ*). As we 
show below, when either officers or drivers are diverse the hit rate—
maximizing equilibrium outcome is not the same as the safety—
maximizing (or crime-minimizing) equilibrium outcome.  
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2.2. Rank-order test  
The most general traffic search game occurs when drivers are racially 
diverse in criminal behavior and police are racially diverse in their 
search practices. Here we present a rank-order test, where the null 
hypothesis is no racial or ethnic discrimination.9 The test includes 
search conditions (i) and no arbitrage conditions (ii). The search con-
ditions are derived from the assumptions we make on officer and 
driver diversity. The no arbitrage conditions are needed to determine 
the absence of discrimination; hence, rank-order tests which ignore 
the no arbitrage conditions will necessarily have limited power but 
even when the no arbitrage conditions are met rank-order tests often 
have power < 1. If the equilibrium search conditions are true then our 
assumptions on driver and officer heterogeneity are likely also true; 
nevertheless, if the no arbitrage conditions are not fulfilled then we 
may conclude that discrimination exists.   
Per our theoretical model, if motorists are idiosyncratic in the cost 
of committing crime (for example, carrying drugs) and officers are 
individually distinctive in the cost of searching motorists, then officer 
reaction functions will be smooth and upward sloping and driver re-
action functions will be smooth and downward sloping (See also An-
tonovics and Knight, 2004).10 This game permits a safety—
maximizing equilibrium where variation in hit rates by race of driver 
and race of officer is consistent with the absence of discriminatory 
policing. For illustrative purposes, assume that white officers search 
more intensely than African American officers and that white drivers 
are less criminal than African American drivers. Per Figure 1, the 
equilibrium search conditions require the maximum search rate 
(shown at point Ea,W) for the combination of officers with the most 
intense search practices and drivers with the most criminal activity. 
The minimum search rate (equilibrium at point Ew,A) will occur for 
the combination of officers with the least intense search practices and 
drivers with the least criminal activity. The no arbitrage conditions 
require that we observe the maximum hit rate for the combination of 
officers with the least intense search practices and drivers with the 
 
9 See also Close and Mason (2003b, 2006) for a rank-order procedure to test for 
racial and ethnic discrimination in trooper enforcement actions. 
10 Possible reasons for upward-sloping trooper response function include: 1) 
trooper heterogeneity in the cost of search (Antonovics and Knight, 2004), 2) dif-
ferential signals of guilt provided by drivers (Bjerk, 2004), or 3) unobservable char-
acteristics of drivers (Antonovics and Knight, 2004). 
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most criminal activity. (See point Ea,A). The minimum hit rate will oc-
cur for the combination of officers with the most intense search prac-
tices and drivers with the least criminal activity, that is, point Ew,W.  
The appropriate safety-maximizing rank-order test for efficient en-
forcement is as follows.  
 
max search rate =   min search rate,  andγ γa W w A, ,b g b g> =  (1.i)
 
max hit rate =   min hit rate.χ χa A w W, ,b g b g> =  (1.ii)
 
As we have discussed, the AF alternative version of this test restates 
the equilibrium search conditions and no arbitrage conditions as fol-
lows.  
 
γ γ γ γw W w A a W a A, , , , ,b g b g b g b g> > and  (AF.i) 
 
χ χ χ χw W w A a W a A, , , , .b g b g b g b g< < and  (AF.ii) 
 
The AF alternative test for efficient enforcement when both driv-
ers and officers are racially heterogeneous has less power than the 
outcomes test presented here because AF do not utilize all of the in-
formation presented by the pattern of equilibrium outcomes. Specifi-
cally, the AF alternative test dispenses with any information regarding 
which group of drivers is the high crime group and which is the low 
crime group. So, the AF alternative test cannot distinguish between 
equilibrium outcomes with heterogeneous officers but homogeneous 
drivers and equilibrium outcomes with heterogeneous officers and 
heterogeneous drivers. Concluding, the AF alternative is an extremely 
limited alternative test since provides no information on efficient en-
forcement; it tells us only that there may be differences in search ac-
tivity by officers of different racial or ethnic groups.   
Figure 1 does not present the hit rate-maximizing equilibrium out-
comes. The equilibrium outcomes presented in Figure 1 are consis-
tent with correct expectations of driver criminality by all officers. In 
this example, African American officers have a higher signal threshold 
for criminal behavior than white officers. Therefore, white officers 
engage in relatively more searches of both white and African Ameri-
can drivers than African American officers. African American drivers 
in this illustrative example are more criminal than white drivers, there-
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fore all officers regardless of race or ethnicity have higher search rates 
and higher hit rates for African American drivers than white drivers. 
But, the mere fact that white officers and African Americans have 
correct but different information (criminal expectations) and different 
policing strategies when facing the same population of drivers means 
that there is an opportunity for search arbitrage, especially if police 
share information. 
 
Figure 1. Traffic search game with diverse drivers and diverse 
officers 
 
 
The hit rate- maximizing equilibrium requires that white officers 
should have identical hit rates for African American and white driv-
ers, even though they will have a higher search rate for African 
American drivers. Similarly, the hit rate-maximizing equilibrium for 
African American officers requires identical hit rates for African 
American and white drivers, even though they will have a higher 
search rate for African American drivers. If racially differential search 
by officers exists, the hit rate-maximizing equilibrium in the traffic 
search game must meet the following conditions. 
 
γ γ γ γw W w A a W a A, , , , ,b g b g b g b g> > and  (2.i) 
 
Ew,A
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χ χ χ χw W a W w A a A, , , , .b g b g b g b g< < and  (2.ii) 
 
The FHP is a state police agency, where all officers undergo iden-
tical training and where each officer is subject to the same command 
structure. So, it is unlikely to be the case that the traffic search game 
will be in hit-rate maximizing equilibrium with racially differential 
search activity by its officers. If so, KPT.i and KPT.ii provide the ap-
propriate hit-rate maximizing hypothesis.   
3. Empirical analysis 
The data are the Florida Highway Patrol’s Traffic Stop Data Reports 
and FHP’s Characteristics of Troops dataset. The combined data 
sources yield a unique and rich dataset, which was originally analyzed 
in Close and Mason (2002).11 The FHP’s Traffic Stop Data contains 
all traffic stops made by sworn personnel form January 2000 to May 
2002. Information from the Traffic Stop Data Report includes the 
county, date of the traffic stop, the trooper’s identification number, 
and the assigned troop identifier. The stopped vehicle is identified by 
state of registration. Drivers are identified by race, ethnicity, sex, and 
driver’s age. The driver’s ethnicity includes whether or not the indi-
vidual is Latino. Racial categories include black, white, Asian, and Na-
tive American (American Indian or Alaskan). Latino drivers may be-
long to any racial category. Additional information in the dataset in-
cludes the number of passengers in the vehicle, the reason for the 
traffic stop, search type, and rationale for consent search. The Char-
acteristics of Troops dataset includes the officer’s identification num-
ber, date of birth, race, and sex. Unlike Latino drivers, Latino officers 
are separate from all other racial groups. The combined dataset will 
allow us to determine whether and to what extent there are racial, 
ethnic, and gender differences in traffic stops and driver treatment 
after a stop has occurred.  
 
11 AF also use this data. Although AF is a derivative of the work of Close and Ma-
son (2002) and related working papers, AF use only the data from January 2000 to 
November 2001. There is no explanation of why they do not use all of the study’s 
data, though the sample they utilize includes over 900,000 observations. 
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3.1. Re-examination of Anwar and Fang: Re-weighted data 
The racial and ethnic composition of officers varies by geographical 
region of deployment. The racial and ethnic composition of the popu-
lation and drivers also varies by county. AF wish to alter the raw data 
so as to simulate a scenario whereby the observed racial and ethnic 
composition of drivers is invariate across the race and ethnicity of 
officers. The re-weighted data are constructed such that the racial and 
ethnic composition of officers does not vary by administrative dis-
trict. Roughly 70 percent of Florida’s state troopers are Non-Hispanic 
white, while 30 percent are either Latino or African American. So, if a 
district has an above average fraction of white officers then a random 
sample of white officers is extracted and added to all the minority ob-
servations. Conversely, if a district has a below average fraction of 
white officers then a random sample of minority officers is extracted 
and added to all the white observations. For example, if the district 
has 85 white officers and 15 African American and Latino officers, 
then a random sample of 35 white officers is extracted and combined 
with the 15 African American and Latino officers. If a district has 55 
white officers and 45 African American and Latino officers, then a 
random sample of 24 African American and Latino officers are ex-
tracted and combined with the 55 white officers.  
Table 2 presents search rates and hit rates by race and ethnicity of 
officer and by race and ethnicity of driver for this re-weighted data. 
Analysis is limited to three social groups: African Americans, Latinos, 
and whites.12 On the whole, only about 1 percent of drivers stopped 
by the FHP undergo a search. But, 0.81 percent of stopped white 
drivers are searched versus 1.35 percent and 1.34 percent of stopped 
African American and Latino drivers. Most searches do not result in a 
hit. The Latino hit rate is 11.5 percent, while the hit rates for African 
Americans and whites are 20.9 percent and 25.1 percent, respectively.  
Chi-square tests reveal that the differences in search rates and hit rates 
by race of driver and by race of officer have p-values < 0.001 (Close 
and Mason, 2006, 2003a; Anwar and Fang, 2006).  
The statistically significant differences in search and hit rates by 
race of officer and by race of driver are informative. Specifically, they 
tell us that we cannot assume that criminality does not differ by race 
 
12 Table 2 in the text is an abbreviated version of Table 1 of Anwar and Fang. Na-
tive Americans and Asian Americans make up a trivial share of driver searches and 
FHP officers. 
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and ethnicity of driver and that policing behavior does not differ by 
race and ethnicity of officer. Hence, we examine the outcomes test 
under the most favorable assumptions for the efficient enforcement 
hypothesis; namely, white officer search intensity > Latino officer 
search intensity > African American officer search intensity and white 
driver criminality < Latino driver criminality < African American 
driver criminality. These are the most favorable assumptions for the 
test because Panel A of Table 2 reveals that all officers search African 
Americans at a greater rate than other groups. Panel A of Table 2 also 
shows that white officers have higher search rates than Latino offi-
cers, for any given race or ethnicity of driver, while Latino officers 
have higher search rates than African American officers.  
Table 2. Search rate and average search success rates 
against motorist of different races (re-weighted data) 
 Race of Trooper  
Panel A: Search Rate (percent)  
 White 
African 
American Latino 
All 
Troopers 
White 0.96 0.27 0.76 0.81 
African American 1.74 0.35 1.21 1.35 
Latino 1.61 0.28 0.99 1.34 
Panel B: Average Success or “Hit” Rate (percent)  
White 24.30 39.40 26.00 25.1 
African American 19.90 26.00 20.80 20.9 
R
ac
e 
of
 D
riv
er
 
Latino 8.50 21.00 14.30 11.5 
Source: Extracted for Anwar and Fang (2006).  
 
1.i and 1.ii (see page 99)  is a very general rank-order test and pro-
vides the most direct comparison with AF. It allows heterogeneity 
among both drivers and officers. For the African American-white pair 
wise comparison we have  
 
max search rate =   min search rate,γ γa W w A, . , .b g b g= > = =1 74 0 27  
 
and 
 
max hit rate = 39.4 min hit rate .≠ = > = ≠ =χ χa A w W, . , . .b g b g26 0 24 3 19 9  
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The search rates agree with the requirements of equation (1.i). The 
inequality for the hit rates is also correct, but the hit rates do not have 
the appropriate outcome for either the maximum or minimum hit 
rate. The data reject the null hypothesis that racially differential search 
behaviors by white and African American officers reflect only effi-
cient enforcement.  
For the white/Latino pair wise comparison we have   
 
max search rate =   min search rate,γ γl W w L, . , .b g b g= > = =1 61 0 76  
 
and 
 
max hit rate = 26.0 min hit rate .≠ = < = ≠ =χ χl L w W, . , . .b g b g14 3 24 3 8 5  
 
The search rates agree with the requirements of equation (1.i). The 
inequality sign for the hit rates is incorrect. Also, the hit rates do not 
have the appropriate outcome for either the maximum or minimum 
hit rate. The data reject the null hypothesis that racially differential 
search behaviors by white and Latino officers reflect only efficient 
enforcement. 
For the African American/Latino pair wise comparison we have  
 
max search rate =   min search rate,γ γa L l A, . , .b g b g= > = =1 21 0 28  
 
and 
 
max hit rate = min hit rate.χ χa A l L, , .b g b g= > = ≠26 14 3  
 
The search rates agree with the requirements of equation (1.i). The 
hit rates agree with the requirements of (1.ii). Hence, for the re-
weighted data and assuming a public safety-maximizing equilibrium, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that Latino and African Ameri-
can officers do not differentially search Latino and African American 
drivers.  
Equations (2.i) and (2.ii) provide the criteria for the hypothesis test 
of hit-rate maximizing efficient enforcement with differential policing 
by Latino and African American officers. The relevant search results 
are γ(l, L) = 0.99 > γ(l, A) = 0.28 and γ(a, L) = 1.21 > γ(a, A) = 0.35. 
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These results agree with the requirements of the efficient search con-
ditions of (2.i). The relevant hit rates are χ(l, L) = 14.3 ≠ χ(a, L) = 
20.8 < χ(l, A) = 21.0 ≠ χ(a, A) = 26.0, which do not agree with the no 
arbitrage conditions of (2.ii). Hence, for the hit-rate maximizing equi-
librium, the data reject the null hypothesis that ethnically differential 
treatment of Latino and African Americans drivers by Latino and Af-
rican American officers represents efficient enforcement rather than 
discriminatory treatment. 
3.2. Analysis of raw data 
In an attempt to establish a comparative benchmark, the AF re-
weighting procedure may introduce bias in the testing process. Spe-
cifically, the rationale for the AF re-weighting procedure is that the 
characteristics of drivers vary across administrative districts. If this is 
not the case the AF simulation may create a sample that yields biased 
results. 
Tables 3a and 3b present the raw (unaltered) search rates and hit 
rates by race, ethnicity, and administrative unit. We may apply both 
the outcomes test presented in this paper (1.i and 1.ii) and the AF test 
to search rates and hit rates derived from the raw data of 10 adminis-
trative units. We limit our observations to males. Additional analysis 
shows that repeating these outcomes tests using African American 
and white women will not alter any of our conclusions. Also, Latina 
stops by African American and Latino officers are too few to use in 
the analysis.   
For each district we carry out pairwise comparisons for white 
males/African American males, white males/Latinos, and African 
American males/Latinos. Hence, there are 30 comparisons. Using the 
AF test, 22 of 30 pairwise comparisons reject the null hypothesis of 
no discrimination. The 8 pairwise comparisons that do not reject the 
null hypothesis of efficient enforcement include 3 white male/African 
American male comparisons (Troops C, G, and H), 3 white male/ 
Latino comparisons (Troops D, E, and F), and 2 African American 
male/Latino comparisons (Troops C and G). Using 1.i and 1.ii, only 1 
of 30 pairwise comparisons fails to reject the null hypothesis of no 
discrimination. In particular, the white male/African American male 
pairwise comparison for westcentral Florida (Troop C) cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of efficient enforcement. 
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Table 3a. Search rates, males, by race of officer, district of 
stop, and race of driver 
 Troop K (Florida Turnpike) 
  Officer 
 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.0049 0.0060 0.0051 
African American 0.0096 0.0075 0.0084 
D
riv
er
 
Latino 0.0057 0.0039 0.0069 
 Troop A (West Florida) 
 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.0061 0.0012 0.0058 
African American 0.0104 0.0011 0.0049 
D
riv
er
 
Latino 0.0489 0.0000 0.0000 
 Troop B (North Central) 
 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.0066 0.0004 0.0042 
African American 0.0119 0.0039 0.0193 
D
riv
er
 
Latino 0.0179 0.0000 0.0194 
 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.0212 0.0026 0.0121 
African American 0.0425 0.0051 0.0189 
D
riv
er
 
Latino 0.0626 0.0110 0.0166 
 Troop D (East Central) 
 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.0066 0.0005 0.0029 
African American 0.0164 0.0012 0.0049 
D
riv
er
 
Latino 0.0090 0.0009 0.0030 
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Table 3a. Continued… 
 Troop E (Dade and Monroe) 
  Officer 
 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.0128 0.0008 0.0054 
African American 0.0239 0.0030 0.0136 
D
riv
er
 
Latino 0.0166 0.0017 0.0066 
 Troop F (South Western) 
 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.0139 0.0047 0.0050 
African American 0.0354 0.0043 0.0179 
D
riv
er
 
Latino 0.0252 0.0062 0.0152 
 Troop G (North Eastern) 
 
 White 
African Ameri-
can Latino 
White 0.0033 0.0046 0.0050 
African American 0.0099 0.0107 0.0043 
D
riv
er
 
Latino 0.0116 0.0236 0.0025 
 Troop H (Capital Region) 
 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.0057 0.0003 0.0000 
African American 0.0099 0.0006 0.0089 
D
riv
er
 
Latino 0.0241 0.0009 0.0000 
 Troop L (South Eastern) 
 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.0048 0.0015 0.0025 
African American 0.0084 0.0008 0.0053 
D
riv
er
 
Latino 0.0080 0.0012 0.0030 
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Table 3b. Hit rates, males, by race of officer, district of stop, 
and race of driver 
Troop K (Florida Turnpike) 
 Officer 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.2879 0.4500 0.5217 
African American 0.2222 0.2083 0.1600 
Latino 0.1651 0.1429 0.3636 
Troop A (West Florida) 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.1881 0.6000 0.0000 
African American 0.2014 0.0000 1.0000 
Latino 0.0878   
Troop B (North Central) 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.3193 0.0000 0.2222 
African American 0.2185 0.6667 0.0000 
Latino 0.0357  0.5000 
Troop C (West Central) 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.2095 0.2571 0.1795 
African American 0.2217 0.5556 0.1250 
Latino 0.0704 0.2857 0.2632 
Troop D (East Central) 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.2828 0.5714 0.5652 
African American 0.2500 0.2000 0.2857 
Latino 0.1343 0.5000 0.1429 
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Table 3b. Continued…. 
 Troop E (Dade and Monroe) 
 Officer 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.1319 0.2857 0.2353 
African American 0.0649 0.0000 0.1892 
Latino 0.0645 0.1379 0.2034 
 Troop F (South Western) 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.2442 0.4348 0.3590 
African American 0.2151 0.0000 0.1364 
Latino 0.1560 0.0000 0.1892 
 Troop G (North Eastern) 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.3402 0.1972 0.0000 
African American 0.3133 0.2857 0.0000 
Latino 0.1463 0.1500 0.0000 
 Troop H (Capital Region) 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.1903 0.5000  
African American 0.1458 0.0000 0.0000 
Latino 0.0577 0.0000 0.3333 
 Troop L (South Eastern) 
 White 
African 
American Latino 
White 0.2607 0.1892 0.3333 
African American 0.1897 0.1429 0.3333 
Latino 0.1717 0.4444  
 
Concluding, our non-parametric results show that there is evidence 
of police bias against African American and Latino drivers by all offi-
cers. Second, white officers search drivers most intensively, while Af-
rican American officers search drivers the least intensely. Third, using 
raw data or re-weighted data does not change our conclusions. 
Fourth, previous tests proposed in the literature (KPT and AF) are 
less definitive than the outcomes test proposed here. Parametric re-
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sults also show that white officers are more likely to search drivers 
than African American and Latino officers, even after controlling for 
the traffic stop rationale, an officer’s cause of suspicion, characteris-
tics of the driver, administrative unit and year of the stop, characteris-
tics of the stop location, and additional characteristics of the officer 
(Close and Mason, 2007).  
4. Conclusions 
Biased policing against racial and ethnic minorities is an important 
public policy issue. Theoretical analysis and empirical research on this 
issue has been plagued by the usual set of problems which confront 
research on discrimination against social groups. At a theoretical level, 
models of discrimination must explain persistence, that is, they must 
explain why discrimination will exist within the context of arbitraging 
behavior and equilibrium outcomes. At an empirical level, the omitted 
variables problem is ever present.  
Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) and Anwar and Fang (2006) 
proposed outcomes tests that are simple to employ and which at-
tempt to elude the problems associated with establishing a compara-
tive benchmark. However, the extant literature has shown that there 
are several problems with the KPT test, while one of its major re-
finements (the Anwar and Fang test) has limited power for determin-
ing discrimination. Anwar and Fang’s proposed alternative test has at 
best only marginal because it fails to take account of information on 
racial and ethnic differs in driver criminality (if there are any).   
This paper presents a more general outcomes test and which has 
greater power than the KPT and AF tests. Our empirical results con-
tradict the central finding of Anwar and Fang; namely, an appropri-
ately designed outcomes tests strongly rejects the null hypothesis that 
FHP troopers of different races do not engage in racial prejudice. 
Specifically, our non-parametric results show that there is evidence of 
racial and ethnic discrimination in police searches of African Ameri-
can and Latino drivers by all officers (white, Latino, and African 
American). Second, white officers search drivers most intensively, 
while African American officers search drivers the least intensely. 
Third, using raw data or re-weighted data does not change our con-
clusions.  
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